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 What is educationally worthwhile knowledge? Revisiting the case for powerful knowledge. 
 
Abstract 
For all the talk of ‘the Knowledge Age’ the nature of knowledge in the context of formal 
education remains a neglected area. Michael Young is one of few sociologists who 
responds to this neglect and puts the question of knowledge squarely back into 
discussions of why formal education matters. In the context of ongoing disputes around 
the curriculum, concerned with factual knowledge and access to multiple ways of 
meaning making as means for individual realisation, attention to the question of 
knowledge is ever more urgent. Young asks “What is educationally worthwhile 
knowledge?” His response goes to the heart of what is distinctive about humans. Drawing 
on the work of Durkheim and Vygotsky, Young provides a rich account of ‘powerful 
knowledge’. This chapter combines his insights with developments in contemporary 
philosophy. It aims to respond to misconstrued readings of Young’s work which takes his 
emphasis on ‘powerful knowledge’ to be at odds with a concern for pedagogy and human 
flourishing. 
 
In the context of formal education, the nature of knowledge is a neglected issue. Michael 
Young is one of few sociologists who has responded to this oversight, and put the question of 
knowledge back into discussions of why formal education matters. The course he has 
followed from the 1970s provides a compelling example of the integral nature of theory and 
practice, and it is a concern with the integral nature of this which underlies arguments put 
forward in this chapter.  
 
Given concerns in the 1970s to establish the right of all to an education that is both 
meaningful and unsegregated by class or accessibility, it is little wonder that Knowledge and 
Control, by questioning established forms of knowledge constitution and production, 
emerged as a book of its time. While the targets of criticism were clear – unequal access and 
the ‘knowledge of the powerful’ – the way forward was problematic not least because the 
criticisms suffered the same defects as that which was being criticized. The striking 
experience of post-apartheid South Africa’s response to the racist curricula of white 
oppressors moved Young’s thinking on. It brought to light serious issues about curricula and 
the need to distinguish knowledge of the powerful from powerful knowledge. These issues are 
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not simply about which forms or types of knowledge should comprise the curriculum. They 
demand attention to the distinction between formal knowledge and knowledge gained 
through everyday activities, a distinction too often ignored in popular commentaries on what 
is wrong with contemporary education. This failure to give the necessary attention due to a 
disregard of the conceptual complexity of formal knowledge is also a consequence of a 
presupposed distinction between mind and world that leads to unanswerable questions of how 
one can be in touch with the other.  By bringing the question of knowledge back in to 
discussions, Young demonstrates the need for a reconsideration of these issues. 
 
Despite the rich development of his thinking about these issues, Young is often associated 
with the knowledge of the powerful, and this is the real target of criticism underlying 
demands for curricula change. This criticism, which all too often takes the shape of a contrast 
between old and new forms of knowledge, is well illustrated by Claxton who fails to 
distinguish the power of knowledge from knowledge of the powerful and caricatures the form 
of knowledge he opposes by ‘drawing on the monastic metaphor… [where] knowledge was 
seen as something that had either been handed down by unimpeachable Authority …mined 
and purified, once upon a time, by men (mostly) who were much cleverer than both the 
students and the teacher, usually in places called universities’ (Claxton, 2008, p. 74). It is 
precisely this characterisation of knowledge that figures in pleas for the reform of education. 
However, criticism is directed at particular bodies of knowledge which occupy key positions 
in curricula dominance and insufficient attention is given to the structure and form of 
knowledge and the resulting pedagogic issues involved in epistemic access. Issues are seldom 
spelt out in popular works and, as a result, the conjunction of unworked out claims in 
combination with a superficial characterisation of knowledge divert attention from the 
difference between knowledge and opinion. A corollary of this is also the failure to 
distinguish what constitutes different forms of knowledge. Claxton attaches great importance 
to students viewing knowledge as provisional and changeable. He reports: 
 
‘In one recent experiment, two Greek psychologists checked to see if 
fifteen-year-olds’ attitudes to “knowledge” influenced how they went 
about learning Newton’s Laws of Motion. Somewhat to their surprise, they 
found that the students who saw knowledge as a provisional, human 
construction, constantly open to question and change, showed a deeper and 
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more accurate understanding of Newton than did their peers who believed 
that Science was Eternal Truth’. (Ibid., p. 76) 
 
However, the interpretation of results in terms of the students’ perspective on knowledge as 
‘a provisional, human construction’ fails to attend to the detail of what students are, in fact, 
accessing. What successful students are accessing is meaning which is internal to a system as 
concepts as these derive their meaning from the role that they play in the system to which 
they belong. Far from Newton’s laws being ‘constantly open to question’, it is necessary for 
the students to become familiar with the constraints that determine the role of concepts 
involved.  The contrast, as Claxton makes it, between ‘certain’ and ‘provisional’ ignores the 
structure and form of the knowledge domain. A proper understanding of Newton’s laws 
involves appreciating how they function within the set of axioms that define the domain in 
which they operate.   Failure to provide ‘criteria for assessment’ and to direct attention to 
what the use of a particular concept commits one to and what those commitments entail in 
relation to limits on the application of the concept, deny the learner full access to knowledge.  
In this connection Nutbrown has shown, ‘Claxton’s account of knowledge opens the door not 
only to a form of relativism but also to subjectivism’ (Nutbrown, 2016, p.20).  
 
Of course, students’ orientation to what they study is crucially important. If they have come to 
think of knowledge only as direct and simple representation of the world they will not develop 
their concepts in a way that allows them to grasp Newton’s laws. However, if it is thought that 
their orientation should lead students to believe that all knowledge needs to be continually 
challenged something has gone badly wrong. Statements such as; ‘That’s how knowledge is 
… it is always provisional and always up for reappraisal’ require careful judgment – is it 
Newton’s laws, within the context of their specification, that are provisional and should be 
challenged by the student? The authors of the research cited by Claxton note that ‘conceptual 
understanding in physics is the product of a gradual, complex process that takes a lot of time 
to accomplish’ (Stathopoulou and Vosnaidou, 2007, p. 259). Interestingly Claxton states that 
knowledge ‘is made up by people’ and while he would undoubtedly accept that what he 
assumes to be ‘made up’ is modified by ‘the empirical’ his position is significantly different 
from that which understands  the structure of thought as connected to the conditions in which 
it emerges. These conditions are not the superficial ones where opinion goes in place of 
knowledge but the fine-grained context, of constraints and articulation, in which meaning is 
both established and developed. It is to this fine-grained context that students need access, for 
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without it, anything goes and there can be no substantial knowledge. The difficulty here is that 
the appropriate argument that students should not be treated as empty vessels to be filled 
becomes, in popular polemics, entwined with a call to see knowledge as provisional without 
specifying any of the conditions required for it to be modified. The failure to appreciate fully 
and to take account of the implications of the fact that knowledge relies on constraints, i.e. 
that the meaning of any one concept is determined by its connection with other concepts, 
leads to the wrong target for critique. Arguments focus on the particular form of knowledge, 
‘mined and purified [in] universities’ rather than the structure and form of that knowledge as it 
is taught in schools. How concepts are constituted within a particular domain is crucial. 
 
A line of criticism similar to that of Claxton is made by Ken Robinson who writes of the 
short comings of ‘an intellectual model of the mind, which was essentially the enlightenment 
view of intelligence; … real intelligence consists in this capacity for a certain type of 
deductive reasoning and a knowledge of the classics originally, what we come to think of as 
academic ability’ (Robinson, 2008). Robinson shares with many this questionable 
characterisation of an enlightenment knowledge whose adoption he sees as ‘trying to meet 
the future by doing what they did in the past’. While Young appreciates the reasons that lead 
to a concern with ‘the knowledge of the powerful’ he rejects this line of criticism. Instead, he 
has addressed the question which the critics of the ‘knowledge of powerful’ have ignored, 
namely what constitutes knowledge? 
 
This reaction against traditional forms of knowledge is not particularly surprising in the 
context of a general anxiety about knowledge that can be found in a broader literature 
(Cowen, 2000; Wells, 2017).  However, as we see below, it is by considering the genesis of 
knowledge and the social articulation of concepts, that distinctions can be drawn between 
impoverished and rich content regardless of the particular content proposed for the 
curriculum.  
 
The idea that forms of knowledge should be challenged in principle, without regard to the 
specific conditions which constitute them, goes hand in hand and is as equally questionable 
as the belief that the constitution of these forms can be understood in terms of the particular 
interests. At issue here is the attempt to enliven educational processes by claiming to 
recognise individuals as unique beings; however to the extent that it is associated with a 
reductive politics of interest, this attempt is doomed to fail.   
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Responding to the importance attached to the grounding of knowledge in interest, Young asks 
‘[H]ow do we rebut the conclusion of the mainstream tradition of the sociology of knowledge 
that knowledge is always an expression of circumscribed activities and interests, and that 
therefore it makes no sense to enquire as to whether there is objectively “better” knowledge?’ 
(Young and Muller, 2015, p. 6). His response draws upon resources which go beyond the 
contemporary debates about aims and deals with knowledge as an emergent historical and 
social process. Like Bernstein, he is concerned with the construction of symbolic systems and 
their social base. It is important to stress that the sociality of knowledge does not, contra 
constructivism, undermine its objectivity; on the contrary, the possibility of truth- falsity 
distinctions is a precondition for it. His line of argument here, which goes to the heart of what 
is distinctive about humans, concerns the symbols and artefacts and practices via which we 
build our world. Drawing on the work of Durkheim, Vygotsky and Cassirer, Young (2008) 
has provided a rich account of what he has termed ‘powerful knowledge’ and this chapter 
connects this account with the educational implications of developments in contemporary 
philosophy, addressing the social articulation at the heart of knowledge. In doing so it aims to 
respond to the misconstrued readings of Young’s work that claim his emphasis on knowledge 
is at odds with a concern for pedagogy and human flourishing, thereby ignoring the very 
purpose of his project. 
 
It is helpful to start with what is distinctive about formal education, for this begins to open up 
the question of knowledge and at the same time leads to an appreciation of its power. Young 
draws on Vygotsky’s distinction between scientific (i.e. academic) concepts and those that 
emerge as generalisations in everyday experience. Scientific concepts are characterised by 
their systematic connections with others belonging to the relevant field. Since the systematic 
connection between concepts is a result of the development of a knowledge field, which in its 
turn expresses new insights, this is no accident. The form and structure of scientific concepts 
permit a degree of voluntary control not available with everyday concepts. Scientific 
concepts have a systematic relation to one another and it is this, rather than simple reference 
to the world, that is crucial to the constitution of their meaning. Concepts can only acquire 
their meaning as elements in a system of concepts and from this it follows that if, for one 
reason or another, an individual concept is modified at least some of the other concepts must 




Due to the nature of their abstractness, scientific concepts - for Vygotsky, academic concepts 
in general - are not fully accessible through everyday experience but instead can only be 
properly accessed through initiation into the relevant domain. The instruction that facilitates 
such initiation bears little relation to the instruction intimated by Claxton and Robinson, 
rather it involves an interaction between teacher and students that enables concepts to be 
situated in the relevant domain in order to be realised as meaningful. It is through this 
interaction that teachers actualise the student’s capacity to make appropriate connection. This 
interaction, when properly effected, enables concepts to be calibrated and made meaningful 
within their particular domains of study.  
 
The fact that scientific concepts are systematically connected is not accidental; connections 
are the result of a long history of human activity. Concepts, in this sense of activity in 
thought, are not abstract at all, in the conventional usage of the term; on the contrary, they are 
deeply entrenched, as moments in the contexts from which they emerge. Vygotsky puts it 
powerfully when he writes: ‘In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a 
concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the result of rational processing of our 
existence and it is mediated knowledge of the object. To think of some object with the help of 
a concept means to include the given object in a complex system of mediating connection and 
relations disclosed in determinations of the concept’ (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53). The contrast 
between this approach and a version of abstraction as merely a matter of generalisation is 
striking, and Vygotsky remarks that if we think that ‘the process of generalising is a direct 
abstraction of traits, then we will inevitably come to the conclusion that thinking abstractly is 
removed from reality’ (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53). However, it widely believed that abstract 
concepts by virtue of being abstract are removed from reality, and this lends weight to the 
idea that a form of knowledge that involves systematic relations between concepts can be 
replaced by a less rigorous one on the grounds that it is more in touch with the reality of 
students’ lives. Yet it is precisely the particular character of what Vygotsky terms scientific 
concepts that requires them to be taught in a formal context rather than to be learnt through 
everyday activity. Although scientific concepts have been develop over centuries of 
accumulated activity, once developed they can be communicated effectively and understood 
formally in comparatively short periods of time.  When we turn to consider how scientific 
concepts function in particular fields of knowledge we see a different picture. Instead of a 
‘direct abstraction of traits’ we see that concepts are formed and function according to the 
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particular relations involved in the ‘determinations of …concept [s]’. Contrary to the idea that 
concepts have a direct representational connection to what they represent we see that their 
power to represent arises in the connections they have with each other i.e. that they function 
within a system of concepts. 
 
Lenny Moss (2003), in his excavation of the history of the most basic biological concepts, 
demonstrates this characteristic of concepts when he shows that there is no one clear concept 
of a gene; rather the gene concept undergoes transformation as it is deployed in research. He 
argues that ‘the term ‘gene’ figures in two distinct explanatory games in molecular biology. 
Each of these two sets of inferences motivated by the gene concept is legitimate in its 
appropriate context, but conflating them leads to fallacious inferences and an inappropriate 
version of genetic determinism’ (Brigandt, 2010). Lack of attention to these differences and 
what determines them leads not only to a misunderstanding of what genes are but also to 
what constitutes knowledge and therefore what an understanding of genetics requires. 
Excavating the history of a concept brings out its indissoluble entanglement with the 
systematic connections that constitute it. When the two versions of a concept (one ‘the heir to 
preformationism and the other the heir to genesis’) are conflated their productive power is 
lost. The meaning of the concept ‘gene’ is constituted by the particular system of connections 
of which it is part and without initiation into this system the student will only learn by rote 
and fail to gain mastery of the concepts involved.  However, without the respective ‘system’ 
students will fail to be initiated and to develop the responsiveness to the particular constraints 
that establish the meaning of ‘gene’ in the first place.  
 
This example from the field of genetics is a contemporary illustration of the life of a concept, 
its application and modification. It illustrates what Vygotsky called ‘the rational processing of 
our existence’ and the ‘complex system of mediating connections and relations’ functioning 
in the ‘determination the concept’. The concept is not an abstraction applied to the world; 
rather it bears its genesis and development within a particular system of application, i.e. its 
history is inextricably involved in its application and result which in turn determines its 
successive shapes as both tool and idea. According to Rouse (2011), we need to understand 
experimental practice as integral to conceptual articulation as opposed to mere support of it.  
The existence of a concept as a living idea rather than a dead representation results from the 
normative constraints within which it is articulated, i.e. the norms that govern its correct 
application. When the constraints are ignored and a concept in one explanatory game is 
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conflated with another in a different explanatory game then problems arise and lead, 
according to Moss, to the unwarranted but popular idea that genes are blueprints for 
organisms. 
 
Significantly, the constitution of knowledge is not a simple matter of applying individual 
concepts; rather, it requires a whole system of concepts in which individual ones may each 
function in a particular way. The limits posed by the systematic relations between concepts 
have consequences for the expression of concept meaning. When limits change the concept 
develops: ‘The establishment of new experimental systems opened  new possibilities for 
conceptual articulation.’ (Rouse, 2011, p. 246).  Rouse, like Moss, also refers to genetics to 
show how new experimental systems can lead to the development of new concepts: 
‘Experimental systems are novel rearrangements of the world that allow some features that 
are not ordinarily manifest and intelligible to show themselves clearly and evidently’ (ibid.). 
He explains that ‘the Drosphilla system …allow[ed] a much more extensive inferential 
articulation of the concept of a gene’ (ibid). While Rouse’s examples are limited to the 
practice of science he is well aware that these advances in the understanding of the sciences 
have implications for philosophy of mind and for epistemology. Although his example of 
stabilising aspects of the world in order to constitute an experimental system refers to 
scientific endeavours, his argument applies more broadly and has implications for the 
conceptualisation of knowledge as such.  
 
In simple terms, we may think of any body of knowledge as finite in the sense of having 
limits which constitute its meaning. The degree of precision involved in the constitution of 
meaning depends upon the system of relations in which a concept is being used and in its turn 
that ‘system’, i.e. the limits and normative constraints involved, depend on the practices in 
which the knowledge is applied. For instance, ‘When we say a landscape is flat we refer to a 
different margin of precision than when we talk about the floor or a monitor screen’ (Stekeler-
Weithofer, 2011, p. 93). Norm governed limits are not automatically explicit; rather, we 
become responsive to them by participating in particular practices. And it is by being 
responsive to them that we have the possibility of both acquiring and changing meaning. The 
possibility of changing meaning arises once the systematic constraints on meaning are made 
visible. It is not a matter of wilful attribution: it is only within the constraints of a system that 
meaning can be articulated and these constraints arise in determined activity in the world.  As 
Stekeler-Weithofer puts it ‘conceptual analysis can never abstract away from Experience’ 
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(ibid.) From which it follows, we need to see ‘knowledge…in the context of performing 
actions and actualising forms properly, that is according to the leading norms governing our 
actions empractically– as far as they are not yet made, in addition, explicit by rule, labels or 
sentences’ (ibid.). This way of thinking about concepts in the context of education may, at 
first sight, appear rigid imposing severe constraints on what we may think, but quite the 
contrary it is the very constraints that give us the freedom to both grasp and modify concepts. 
This approach to knowledge properly reflects ‘Man [as] a species (Lebewesen) with a 
particular lifeform (Lebensform)’ (ibid.). Humans are responsive to reasons and not simply 
bound by causes, and due to this they are a distinctive form of life. 
 
For students, initiation into domains of knowledge creates the space for their concepts to be 
actualised in new ways. It is through this initiation that they can learn to think systematically. 
Michael Young’s ‘powerful knowledge’ or the power of knowledge domains cannot be 
reduced to the interest of specific groups. Rather it needs to be understood as an integral 
element of history itself. This is perfectly in-keeping with Young’s concern for truth and 
truthfulness (Young and Muller, 2015). What appears irrelevant to the needs and interests of 
learners is not the alien nature of knowledge as the property of the powerful, as commonly 
believed, but a result of learners having been introduced to concepts by inappropriate 
pedagogy which fails to pay due attention to the inferential nature of the knowledge domain.  
It is the lack of appreciation for the central role of the connection between concepts that 
impoverishes classroom practice.  
 
The pedagogic decisions required to provide access to a knowledge domain require respect 
for the integrity of the domain.  For example the teacher who introduces students to the Bible 
in an RE lesson by encouraging them to make their own bibles (e.g. a ‘fashion bible’, a ‘car 
bible’) abandons the opportunity to teach the actuality of the Bible as variously a  religious, 
literary or historical document. The teacher who ‘facilitates’ a dialogue about preferences for 
works of art without any discussion of the reasons for them not only loses the chance to 
encourage learners to reason.  In doing so, they substitute the opportunity for engaging with 
the question of what art is with the voicing of unchallenged opinion (Derry, 2016).  These 
pedagogic decisions, although encouraged by a worthy intention to provide access to learners 
and allow them to construct their meaning based on their supposed interests, raises the very 
concerns that led Young to ask what is educationally worthwhile knowledge? 
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The epistemological presuppositions associated with learner interest which inform 
contemporary political challenges to the curriculum fail to recognise the integral connection 
between knowledge forms and the human condition. As a result, choices about ‘what 
knowledge’, as though knowledge came in packets, can take an arbitrary form where one area 
(interest of the students) can replace another (historically generated forms). The lack of a 
fine-grained account of what knowledge consists allows a form of knowledge in one area to 
slide into another without respect for the integrity of the knowledge domain. Vygotsky 
criticises the conflation of concepts in one knowledge domain with concepts in another as 
illegitimate. Referring to the different psychological approaches to personality of Stern, 
Bekhterev, Wertheimer and Freud, he argues: ‘Each of these four ideas are extremely rich, 
full of meaning and sense, full of value and fruitful in its own place. But elevated to the rank 
of universal laws, they are worthy of each other, they are absolutely equal to each other, like 
round and empty zeros … to try and explain everything means to explain nothing’ (Vygotsky, 
1997, pp. 245-246). 
 
An appreciation of why licentiousness with regard to knowledge is illegitimate requires a 
more profound sense not only of the significance of human sociality but also of the integral 
nature of thought and world. This is precisely what Young’s sources, Cassirer and Durkheim, 
attend to in emphasising the distinctiveness of humans, i.e. that we mediate existence.  
 
Rouse’s discussion of recent advances in philosophical understanding showing how concepts 
function in the practice of sciences, and ‘acquire content in relation to experience’ (Rouse, 
2011, p. 244), is a different way of thinking about mind and world. Instead of one where 
conceptual articulation is solely a linguistic activity responding to but not integral to worldly 
activity, conceptual articulation is an integral part of activity itself. 
 
A mode of understanding which attempts to do justice to the distinctiveness of the relation of 
mind and world features in one of Young’s sources, that of Ernst Cassirer. For Young and his 
co-author Muller, Cassirer offers the resources for providing a more fine-grained account of 
objectivity. According to Young ‘rather than classifying different knowledge structures, 
Cassirer classifies different types of objectivity, according to the relationship that concepts of 
knowledge form [my italics] have to their object’ (Young and Muller, 2015, p. 32).  Cassirer 
rejects the natural sciences as the standard to which other disciplines should conform in 
favour of an approach which emphasises the specific relation of the knowledge form to its 
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object. Since the relation of knowledge to its object is established by concrete activity in the 
world and not by revelation, understanding knowledge and objectivity requires investigation 
of the sociological and its philosophical dimension. Relevant to this activity is what 
Habermas calls ‘The liberating power of symbols’. Unlike the particular immediate relation 
to the world of animals, symbols allow humans to have ‘a thoughtful, reflectively controlled 
reaction to the world’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 7). The use of the term symbol here is broad and 
includes complex formations. Young and Muller see this role of symbols as significant: 
‘ideas and institutions are expressive; that is, they are part of social action that is both of the 
objective world but suffused by subjective meanings which frequently push at the bounds of 
objective categories’ (Young 2008, p. 204). 
 
Where Young’s use of Cassirer helps us to appreciate knowledge as a result of self-
determining human practices as opposed to animal sentience, Durkheim provides the basis 
for a sociological account of knowledge rooted in material human activities. The advantage 
of this, for Young, is to avoid the pitfalls which, because of the importance attached to 
‘interest groups or relations of power’, fail to recognise the ‘power of knowledge’. 
 
An important theme in the work of Durkheim, Bernstein and Young is that the nature of the 
interconnectedness of things does not arise arbitrarily but rather arises from the social order 
that constitutes them and in turn is constituted by them. The grounding of modes of thought 
in the practices which mediate human relations with nature lies at the heart of the sociological 
approach which seeks to establish that knowledge itself is a part of the ‘material’ world. In 
rejecting criticisms of his own position on knowledge, Young turns to Durkheim’s criticism 
of the pragmatism of his time for its approach to knowledge that lacked any ‘external, 
constraining, obligatory’ force (Young, 2008, p. 21). For Durkheim, understanding the social 
is never simply a matter of attributing power to perceived social forces; rather, the social is 
the foundation not only of the form of what we know but also the very basis of our powers of 
reasoning.  
 
Durkheim is important for Young because he searched for an understanding of thought that 
went beyond interests to the material conditions of existence (the Lebensform). The primitive 
distinction between the sacred and the profane plays a critical role in the formation of 
classification and logic, according to Durkheim. In addition, it was in this primitive 
distinction that he perceived the origins of systematicity in thought. His study of the forms of 
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religious life led him to argue that: ‘Men owe to religion not only the content of their 
knowledge, in significant part, but also the form in which that knowledge is elaborated’ 
(Durkheim, 1995, p. 8). Giving priority to the material conditions of existence, Durkheim 
argued that ‘[it is not] that the social relations of men are based on the logical relations 
between things, in reality, it is the former which have provided the prototype for the latter 
(Durkheim and Mauss, 1970, p. 82). For Young what is significant here is that ‘[t]he power 
of logic had to refer to factors that were a priori and external to any specific human activity. 
In other words, to restate a key Durkheimian point, the compelling power of logic, and hence 
of knowledge, had to come from society as a reality sui generis’ (Young, 2008, p. 70). It 
follows from seeing forms of knowledge in these terms that is not adequate to explain them 
simply in terms of the interest of particular individuals, defined social groups or power 
relations. It is the insights gained from this approach that give Young the resources to 
distinguish forms of knowledge so as to provide a basis for what knowledge curricula should 
be designed to include. 
 
Young sees parallels between Vygotsky’s distinction between scientific and everyday 
concepts and Durkheim’s distinction between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’: ‘Both the 
‘sacred’ and ‘theoretical’ concepts are expressed in terms of systematic relationships between 
concepts that are independent of specific contexts’ (Young, 2007, p. 52).  The systematic 
character of the relationship between concepts has significant implications both for education 
practice and the understanding of knowledge. In respect to the latter, Rouse’s account of the 
inseparability of activity and thought is especially important. 
 
It is important to recognise Durkheim’s argument that systematic thought is a distinctive and 
essential characteristic of human activity. As he puts it:  
 
… to explain is to connect things to other things; it is to establish 
relationships between things that make them appear to us as functions of 
one another…. and as vibrating sympathetically in accordance with an 
internal law that is rooted in their nature. When I learn that A regularly 
precedes B, my knowledge is enriched with a new piece of knowledge but 
my intelligence is in no way satisfied by an observation that does not carry a 
reason with it. I begin to understand only if it is possible for me to conceive 
of B in some way that makes it appear to me as not foreign to A but united 
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with A in a relation of kinship. The great service that religions have 
rendered to thought is to have constructed a first representation of what the 
relations of kinship between things might be. (Durkheim, 1995, p. 239)  
 
For Durkheim, thinking and knowing are moments of human activity in the world.  The 
notion of the social articulation of thought is crucial here. It is only in the context of this 
appreciation of the indissoluble connectedness of mind with world that the nature of 
knowledge can be fully appreciated. 
 
Problems arise due to the presuppositions that inform our conceptions of knowledge. Even 
these presuppositions are not free of the inextricably link between the movement of thought 
and the organisation of practices. This was noted by Bernstein when he bemoaned the 
contemporary context in which thinking about knowledge takes place. Moore (2012) explains 
that Bernstein’s concerns were prompted by the marketization and managerialism that infuses 
contemporary education with, ‘the domination of the intrinsic by the extrinsic, the sacred by 
the profane’ (Moore, 2012, p. 188):  
 
Of fundamental significance, there is a new concept of knowledge and of its 
relation to those who create it and use it. This new concept is a truly secular 
concept. Knowledge should flow like money to wherever it can create 
advantage and profit. Indeed knowledge is not like money, it is money. 
Knowledge is divorced from persons, their commitments, their personal 
dedications. These become impediments, restrictions on the flow of 
knowledge, and introduce deformations in the working of the symbolic 
market. Moving knowledge about, or even creating it, should not be more 
difficult than moving and regulating money. Knowledge, after nearly a 
thousand years, is divorced from inwardness and literarily dehumanised. 
Once knowledge is separated from inwardness, from commitment, from 
personal dedication, from the deep structure of the self, then people may be 
moved about, substituted for each other and excluded from the market.    
(Bernstein cited in Moore, 2012, p. 188)   
 
The anxiety about knowledge, marked out so clearly by Young, arises in the context of a 
detached notion of knowledge which effectually sees thought in terms of ‘justified true 
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belief’. What critics of Young do not give priority to is the life activity of humans, i.e. the 
social articulation of thought. In order to recognise the indissoluble connection of thought and 
world it is necessary to give interaction in the world priority. Rouse confirms this priority 
when he writes that:  
 
The primary phenomenon to understand … is not the content, justification, 
and truth of beliefs but instead the opening and sustaining of a “space of 
reasons” in which there could be conceptually articulated meaning and 
justification at all …This “space of reasons” is an ongoing pattern of 
interaction among ourselves and with our partially shared surroundings.    
(Rouse, 2015, p. 17)  
 
The Space of Reasons refers here to the normative space we inhabit (Testa, 2009). In 
Durkheim’s study of religions, for example, the possibilities of classifying arises by virtue of 
the norms governing the distinction between sacred and profane. In the gene concept, norms 
legitimate its use in one context and not in another.   
 
Recognising the influence of Brandom (1996, 2000), Rouse argues that we ought to think of 
the process by which knowledge itself develops as one of inferential articulation (Rouse, 
2011). Crucially he argues that the inferential articulation of scientific concepts must 
incorporate the systematic development of a domain of phenomena within which objects can 
manifest the appropriate conceptual differences. The experimental practices that open such a 
domain thereby make it possible to form judgements about entities and features within that 
domain, but the practices themselves already articulate ‘judgeable contents’ prior to the 
explicit articulation of judgements’. Like Durkheim, for Rouse, it is social practices that 
intervene to organise the world in particular ways that offers the possibility of intelligibility 
in the form of ‘judgeable contents’. 
 
By attending to the integral connection between the thought and world it becomes possible to 
appreciate the significance of domains of knowledge but at the same time to be wary of the 
genericism that are all too popular in contemporary education (Young, 2007). This is 
precisely what Vygotsky warned against when he criticised the conflation of concepts from 
different domains. On the contrary, following Vygotsky, it is necessary to consider the 
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integrity of domains of knowledge in terms of the way in which particular concepts are 
articulated within the constraints of that domain.  
 
If teachers are to assist students, in gaining epistemic access to a domain of study, attention to 
the systematic character of the knowledge domain is vital. Teachers need to give students 
access to the systematic constraints on concept use within a particular knowledge domain in 
order that they (the students) may come to appreciate how particular ideas function and 
therefore access their meaning. Attention to the structure of knowledge is necessary; indeed, 
it is important to understand that concepts exist in definite relations dependent upon the 
domain in which they function.  
 
Under the rubric of criticism such as ‘the handing down of unimpeachable authority’, it is not 
the ‘enlightenment view of intelligence’ nor an excessive emphasis on ‘deductive reasoning’ 
that is being criticised but the very concept of knowledge domains themselves. What is 
neglected in these criticisms is precisely the issue that Young attends to, i.e. the structure and 
form of knowledge. When this is understood in terms of inferential articulation, a knowledge 
domain need no longer be seen as the provenance of dead white men but recognised as a 
dynamic tool honed over centuries that can provide students with the power of knowledge.  
 
A significant point arising from the line of inquiry pursued by Young is that passing on of 
knowledge from one generation to the next must be understood as initiation into the lifeworld 
rather than a simple transfer of revealed truths. Particular forms of knowledge are not matters 
simply of group interest. Any equation of ruling ideas with the ruling class or of powerful 
knowledge with the knowledge of the powerful begs the questions that Young has addressed.  
 
When Marx, in a manuscript that he consigned to the mice, pointed out that ‘It has not 
occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German 
philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material 
surroundings’ (Marx and Engels, 1987,  p.41) his target was the abstract idealism pervading 
the thought of his contemporaries. He bemoaned the detachment of thought from what later 
became called the lifeworld in which it emerges, and he insisted on starting with the 
conditions which humans produce by their own activity. The thin characterisation of 
knowledge informing debates about curricula, coupled with the desire to replace one content 
with another, fails to attend to the structure, form and genesis of knowledge which are at the 
16  
heart of Young’s project. The failure to recognise how knowledge has really developed in 
history, leaving students without access to ‘powerful knowledge’, ends up by serving the 
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